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Highlights
• Expressive search query patterns: The system supports versatile search
query patterns, such as the single/conjunctive keyword queries which are
the most common search queries in data retrieval, the equality and multi-
dimensional range queries which enable flexible numeric type data search,
the subset queries which determine whether an encrypted element belongs
to a specific set, and the boolean queries which support keyword search in
which the keywords are connected by boolean operators “AND-OR-NOT”.
• Ranked search: In our system, a data owner defines a weightage for each
keyword according to the keyword importance during data encryption.
To conduct keyword search over encrypted documents, a data user sets
different preference scores for the queried keywords and uses a trapdoor
generation algorithm to generate a query trapdoor. Upon receiving the
query trapdoor, the cloud server computes the relevance scores of the
search results in an encrypted form and returns the top-k results to the
data user.
• Flexible user authorization and revocation: The system allows a data
owner to delegate his search privileges to data users while without reveal-
ing his secret key. The privilege delegation is constrained by a predefined
time period and it expires automatically beyond the time period. The sys-
tem enables the data owner to revoke the delegation within the validity
time period in case a data user is found behaving maliciously.
• Multi-domain data retrieval: The system enables a data user to indepen-
dently generate a query trapdoor. Another advantage of the system is
that, upon authorization, a data user can conduct multi-domain search,
i.e., use a single query trapdoor to search over encrypted documents from
multiple data owners. On the contrary, in existing schemes in the liter-
ature, a data user has to generate n different trapdoors to search over
encrypted documents from n data owners.
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• Resistance to off-line keyword guessing attack: In existing searchable en-
cryption schemes, the test algorithm reveals search result, which allows an
attacker to launch off-line KG attack. Our searchable encryption system
adopts an architecture which is completely different from existing systems.
The search result in our system is in ciphertext form and only the autho-
rized data user is able to decrypt the result, which prevents the off-line
KG attack.
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Abstract
Data security and privacy concerns in cloud storage services compel data own-
ers to encrypt their sensitive data before outsourcing. Standard encryption
systems, however, hinder users from issuing search queries on encrypted data.
Though various systems for search over encrypted data have been proposed in
the literature, existing systems use different encrypted index structures to con-
duct search on different search query patterns and hence are not compatible
with each other. In this paper, we propose a query over encrypted data sys-
tem which supports expressive search query patterns, such as single/conjunctive
keyword query, range query, boolean query and mixed boolean query, all using
a single encrypted index structure. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed
system enables the most expressive query pattern search among all the existing
solutions. In addition, the system allows data users to simultaneously query
over encrypted documents from multiple data owners using one query trapdoor
and supports flexible user authorization and revocation. We show that our sys-
tem is secure and resists keyword guessing attack. We also conduct extensive
experiments and demonstrate that the system is more efficient than other public
key searchable encryption systems.
Keywords: query over encrypted data, range search, boolean search, subset
search, multiple users.
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1. Introduction
Outsourced data storage services are prevalent these days, which allow com-
panies and organizations to store enormous amount of data in the cloud while
saving them the high cost of deploying and managing local storage infrastruc-
tures. As the number of high profile data thefts increases, data security and
privacy in the cloud is becoming a serious concern to data owners which mo-
tivates them to encrypt their data before outsourcing. However, standard en-
cryption techniques hinder users from issuing search queries on the encrypted
data due to unreadability of the ciphertext. Searchable encryption [3] is an
attractive approach to support keyword search over encrypted data and has re-
ceived considerable attention from both academic and industry. In searchable
encryption, to retrieve encrypted data containing a certain keyword pattern,
also called query pattern, a data user generates a query trapdoor based on the
keyword pattern and sends the trapdoor to a cloud server which in turn uses a
test algorithm to retrieve all the encrypted documents satisfying the keyword
pattern and returns the result to the data user.
An ideal searchable encryption system should support expressive query pat-
terns, such as conjunctive keyword query, range query, boolean query and mixed
boolean query. For instance, the electronic health record (EHR) (see Table 1)
contains the keywords: patient name, age, blood pressure, sex and disease.
Suppose a doctor want to retrieve all the encrypted EHRs that satisfy: pa-
tient’s age is in the range [40, 60] and blood pressure is higher than 140 mmHg.
He submits a range query {(40 ≤ age ≤ 60) ∧ (blood pressure > 140)} to
the cloud server. Then, file 1 is returned as the search result. Suppose a
doctor want to find the EHRs that satisfy: the patient is a male or the dis-
ease is diabetes, and patient age is not 50. He submits the boolean query
{[(gender = male) ∨ (disease = diabetes)] ∧ [¬(age=50)]} to the cloud server.
Then, file 2 and file 3 are returned as the search results. Supporting flexible
search patterns is a crucial aspect to enhance the user experience in secure
4
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remote storage systems.
Table 1: Electronic Healthcare Record Example
File
Patient
Name
Age
Blood
Pressure
Sex Disease
File 1 Patient 1 57 153 Female Hypertension
File 2 Patient 2 47 115 Female Diabetes
File 3 Patient 3 24 107 Male Fracture
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
However, existing searchable encryption systems are far from ideal and suffer
from the following shortcomings. First, existing systems are based on entirely
different constructions and can not simultaneously support all query patterns.
The structures of the encrypted keyword indices in these systems are totally
different and are not compatible with each other. As a result, it is impossible
to integrate them together to build a unified encrypted data storage platform
and support versatile search query patterns.
Second, existing searchable encryption systems can only perform single-
domain keyword search, i.e., a query trapdoor can only be used to search over
encrypted documents from a single data owner. If the data user wants to con-
duct multi-domain keyword search, i.e., search over encrypted documents from
multiple data owners, she has to separately search over each data owner’s data
using different trapdoors, which is troublesome and inefficient for large storage
systems supporting documents from many data owners.
Third, the cloud server knows the result of search in the existing systems,
such that the server learns the usage frequency of documents. Moreover, the
test results in the existing systems can be used for off-line keyword guessing
(KG) attack [6, 32], in which an attacker exploits the low-entropy characteristic
of keywords and guesses keywords off-line using the test algorithm. To prevent
leakage of statistic information and resist off-line KG attack, it is important to
hide the test result from both the cloud server and the attackers.
5
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1.1. Contributions
To overcome the shortcomings in the existing systems mentioned above, we
propose a query over encrypted data system which supports expressive search
query patterns, such as single/conjunctive keyword query, multi-dimensional
range query, subset query, boolean query and mixed boolean query, all using
a single encrypted index structure. Upon receiving a user query, the cloud
server calculates the relevance scores and returns the top-k results to the user.
To the best of our knowledge, our system is the most expressive among all
existing search over encrypted data systems. Specifically, our system possesses
the following desirable features.
• Expressive search query patterns. The system supports versatile
search query patterns, such as the single/conjunctive keyword queries
which are the most common search queries in data retrieval, the equality
and multi-dimensional range queries which enable flexible numeric type
data search, the subset queries which determine whether an encrypted
element belongs to a specific set, and the boolean queries which support
keyword search in which the keywords are connected by boolean operators
“AND-OR-NOT”.
• Ranked search. In our system, a data owner defines a weightage for each
keyword according to the keyword importance during data encryption.
To conduct keyword search over encrypted documents, a data user sets
different preference scores for the queried keywords and uses a trapdoor
generation algorithm to generate a query trapdoor. Upon receiving the
query trapdoor, the cloud server computes the relevance scores of the
search results in an encrypted form and returns the top-k results to the
data user.
• Flexible user authorization and revocation. The system allows a
data owner to delegate his search privileges to data users while without
revealing his secret key. The privilege delegation is constrained by a pre-
6
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defined time period and it expires automatically beyond the time period.
The system enables the data owner to revoke the delegation within the
validity time period in case a data user is found behaving maliciously.
• Multi-domain data retrieval. The system also enables a data user
to independently generate a query trapdoor without the help of the data
owner or a trusted third party. Another advantage of the system is that,
upon authorization, a data user can conduct multi-domain search, i.e., use
a single query trapdoor to search over encrypted documents from multiple
data owners. On the contrary, in existing schemes in the literature, a
data user has to generate n different trapdoors to search over encrypted
documents from n data owners.
• Resistance to off-line keyword guessing attack. In existing search-
able encryption schemes, the test algorithm reveals search result, which
indicates that whether the query trapdoor contains the same keyword as
in the encrypted index. Unfortunately, knowing the search result allows
an attacker to launch off-line KG attack. If the search result is unknown
to the cloud server or attacker, then they will be prevented from carrying
out the off-line KG attack since it is impossible for them to test whether
the guessed keyword is correct or not. Our query over encrypted data
system adopts an architecture which is completely different from existing
systems. The search result in our system is in ciphertext form and only
the authorized data user is able to decrypt the result, which prevents the
off-line KG attack.
We formally analyze the security of the proposed system, and conduct ex-
tensive experiments to study its computation and communication efficiency, and
compare it with those of the existing public key searchable encryptions systems.
1.2. Related Work
In 2004, Boneh et al. [3] proposed the notion of public key encryption with
keyword search (PEKS), which enables keyword search in public key system. In
7
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
PEKS [3, 29, 30, 33], a keyword is extracted from a file and encrypted. Then,
the encrypted file and encrypted index are outsourced for remote storage. A
data user generates a query trapdoor using his own secret key to issue a search
query. The cloud server tests whether the encrypted index and trapdoor contain
the same keyword without leaning the underlying keyword and plaintext. Later,
PEKS was extended to conjunctive keyword search [11, 31, 15], where a set of
keywords are extracted from a file and a data user generates a trapdoor for
several keywords. If the encrypted index contains all these queried keywords,
the file is regarded as a match.
In 2007, Boneh and Waters [4] proposed a searchable encryption scheme
supporting conjunctive, subset and range queries. The main tool used in their
scheme is the hidden vector encryption (HVE), which is a generalization of
anonymous identity based encryption (AIBE). Equality, comparison and subset
conjunctions are allowed to be queried in their scheme [4], which is deemed as
the most expressive PEKS scheme in the literature.
Later, Shi et al. [25] investigated the multi-dimensional range query problem
and realized “hyper-range” search to test whether a point falls inside a hyper-
rectangle. Shi’s scheme [25] is constructed based on AIBE. Hor et al. [10]
also utilized a bucketization procedure to handle the multi-dimensional range
searchable encryption problem. However, it evaluates the range queries in an
approximate manner and the false positive probability is inevitable in their
returned results. Wen et al. [28] proposed a HVE based range query scheme
over encrypted metering data, where a range query is transformed into two
query trapdoors to find the match results. A disadvantages of these schemes
[4, 10, 25, 28] is that a large amount of exponentiation and bilinear computations
are required in the system.
In 2014, Wang et al. [26] constructed a tree-based public-key multi-dimensional
range searchable encryption scheme to improve the security and scalability. The
construction bases on HVE and R-tree, which is a type of multi-dimensional data
structure. In 2017, Wang et al. [27] proposed another two range searchable en-
cryption schemes in the symmetric key setting, which leverage a binary tree in
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the constructions. The first one is efficient when the values in the range query
are sparsely distributed in the encrypted data, and the second one optimizes
the token size and saves token generation cost. However, the symmetric key
setting in Wang’s [27] scheme is only suitable for the single user scenario and
not practical for multiple user applications.
Boolean query is frequently used in plaintext data retrieval. This query
paradigm was studied by Ohtaki et al. [22] over encrypted data in 2008, which
utilized Bloom filter to encrypt the keyword index. It shortens the comparison
time but brings false probability of the returned result. Then, Moataz et al. [21]
leveraged the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization method to construct a boolean
symmetric searchable encryption. Cash et al. [7] proposed a highly-scalable
searchable encryption scheme that supports conjunctive search and boolean
queries, which utilizes tuple set (a new primitive defined in [7]) to construct
the scheme. However, it leaks the form of data access pattern to gain higher
efficiency. Later, Li et al. [14] utilized super-increasing sequence and secure
k-nearest neighbour methods to design a new boolean searchable encryption
scheme. These schemes [22, 21, 7, 14] supporting boolean query are all con-
structed in the symmetric key setting. In 2016, Chen et al. [8] proposed a
dual server PEKS system to secure the cloud storage, which utilizes smooth
projective hash functions as core element to construct a generic scheme. The
two servers in Chen’s system are assumed not to collude, and an efficient in-
stantiation of the system is designed based on the Diffie-Hellman problem.
2. Preliminary
2.1. Paillier Cryptosystem with Threshold Decryption
The Paillier cryptosystem [24] with threshold decryption (PCTD) in [18, 5]
is used in this paper for data encryption and preventing the secret key leakage
to any single party. Let L(X) denote the bit length of X.
KeyGen: Let κ be the security parameter and p, q be two large prime
numbers such that L(p) = L(q) = κ. Let N = pq and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1)
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1. Define a function L(x) = x−1N and select a generator g of order ord(g) =
(p − 1)(q − 1)/2. The system public parameter is PP = (g,N). The master
secret key of the system is SK = λ. A user i in the system is assigned a secret
key ski ∈ ZN and a public key pki = gski mod N2.
Encryption: On input a plaintext m ∈ ZN , a user randomly selects r ∈
[1, N/4] and uses his public key pki to encrypt m into ciphertext [m]pki =
(C1, C2), in which C1 = pk
r
i (1 +mN) mod N
2 and C2 = g
r mod N2.
Decryption with ski: On input ciphertext [m]pki and secret key ski, the
message can be recovered by computing m = L(C1/C
ski
2 mod N
2).
Decryption with master secret key: Using the master secret key SK =
λ of the system, any ciphertext [m]pki encrypted under any public key can be
decrypted by computing Cλ1 = (pk
r
i )
λ(1 +mNλ) = (1 +mNλ) mod N2. Since
gcd(λ,N) = 1 holds 2, we have m = L(Cλ1 mod N
2)λ−1 mod N.
Master secret key splitting: The master secret key SK = λ is randomly
split into two parts SK1 = λ1 and SK2 = λ2 such that λ1 +λ2 ≡ 0 mod λ and
λ1 + λ2 ≡ 1 mod N2.
Partial Decryption with SK1 (PD1): On input the ciphertext [m]pki =
(C1, C2), SK1 = λ1 is used to compute a partially decrypted ciphertext C
(1)
1 =
(C1)
λ1 = (pkri )
λ1(1 +mNλ1) mod N
2.
Partial Decryption with SK2 (PD2): On input [m]pki and C
(1)
1 , SK2 = λ2
is used to first compute C
(2)
1 = (C1)
λ2 = (pkri )
λ2(1+mNλ2) mod N
2, and then
recover the message by computing m = L(C
(1)
1 · C(2)1 ).
Ciphertext Refresh (CR): CR algorithm is utilized to refresh a ciphertext
[m]pki = (C1, C2) to a new ciphertext [m
′]pki = (C
′
1, C
′
2) such that m = m
′. It
selects a random r′ ∈ ZN and calculates C ′1 = C1 · hr
′
i mod N
2, C ′2 = C2 · gr
′
mod N2.
It is easy to verify that PCTD is additive homomorphic: [m1]pki ·[m2]pki =
[m1 +m2]pki and ([m]pki)
r = [r ·m]pki for random r ∈ ZN .
1lcm : lowest common multiple.
2gcd: greatest common divider.
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The following protocols in [18] are used in the proposed system. Let pkA
and pkB be the public keys of users A and B, respectively, and pkΣ be a public
key to be specified later.
Secure Addition Protocol across Domains (SAD): Given [X]pkA and
[Y ]pkB , SAD protocol securely calculates [X + Y ]pkΣ .
Secure Multiplication Protocol across Domains (SMD): Given [X]pkA
and [Y ]pkB , SMD protocol securely calculates [X · Y ]pkΣ .
Secure Less Than Protocol across Domains (SLT): Given [X]pkA and
[Y ]pkB , SLT protocol securely calculates [u
∗]pkΣ = SLT([X]pkA , [Y ]pkB ), where
u∗ = 1 if X < Y and u∗ = 0 if X ≥ Y .
(QFU\SW
&LSKHUWH[W
$6&,,FRGH
'HFLPDO,QWHJHU
0XOWLSO\
$GG
%LJ,QWHJHU
(QFU\SW
&LSKHUWH[W
  uu   uu   uu   uu   uu   uu
Figure 1: Example of K2C
2.2. Keyword Encryption
An important task of our system is to encode a keyword to a unique integer in
ZN and then encrypt it to a ciphertext, which eliminates the false probability in
the search process. The keyword to ciphertext conversion algorithm, named K2C
algorithm, is illustrated in Figure 1. The algorithm first encodes each character
in the keyword to its ASCII code in hexadecimal formation and then transforms
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each code into its decimal equivalent multiplied by a coefficient according to the
position of the character in the keyword. Lastly, the algorithm adds all these
weighted decimal integers together to obtain a big integer in ZN and transforms
it into a ciphertext.
3. System and Security Models
3.1. System Model
 
'DWD2ZQHUV
&ORXG
3ODWIRUP&3
&RPSXWDWLRQ
6HUYLFH
3URYLGHU&63
.H\*HQHUDWLRQ
&HQWUH.*&

'DWDXVHUV
66/7/6
66/7/666/7/6
Figure 2: System Model
Figure 2 shows the system model, which consists of the following entities.
• Key generation center (KGC) is a fully trusted entity and responsible
to generate system public parameter, master public/secret key for the
system. KGC generates secret keys for CP and CSP. KGC also generates
public/secret key pair for data owner and data users.
• Cloud platform (CP) is tasked to provide storage service for data own-
ers and responds on search queries from data users. Receiving a search
request, CP checks whether the data user has the search authority. If the
data user does not have the authority, CP rejects the search request. Oth-
erwise, CP interacts with computing service provider (CSP) to execute
the test protocol. Then, the search result is returned to the data user.
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• Computing service provider (CSP) provides online computation ser-
vice and interacts with CP to carry out the required computations. In the
test protocols, the CSP interacts with CP to calculate the search result.
• Data owner encrypts data with his public key, and sends the ciphertexts
to CP for outsourced storage. In the encryption phase, the data owner
extracts keywords from the file, and encrypts both the keywords and the
file. Then, the data owner uploads the encrypted keyword index and en-
crypted file to CP for remote storage. If a data user requests the search
authority on the encrypted data, the data owner generates an authoriza-
tion certificate and an authorization public/secret key pair for the data
user. The data owner also has the right to revoke the authorization.
• Data user generates a query trapdoor, which is sent to CP for searching
over encrypted data. If a data user wants to search on one data owner’s en-
crypted data, he requests the search authorization from the data owner.
If a data user wants to simultaneously search on multiple data owner’s
encrypted data, he firstly requests the search authorization from each
individual data owner. Then, he submits the obtained authorization cer-
tificates to KGC to get a simultaneously search authorization certificate
and the related authorization public/secret key pair. In the query phase,
the data user submits the keyword trapdoor and certificate to the CP to
issue a search request. Receiving the search result, the data user recovers
the plaintext file.
In this system, CP and CSP are assumed to be non-colluding entities. More-
over, the communication channel between data owner and CP, data user and
CP, CP and CSP are protected by the secure mechanisms, such as the secure
sockets layer (SSL) or transport layer security (TLS) protocol, to prevent the
tampering attack.
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3.2. System Formal Definition
Definition 1. An expressive query over outsourced encrypted data system is
formally defined by the following algorithms.
• Setup(κ). The input of the system setup algorithm Setup is the security
parameter κ ∈ N. It generates the system public parameter PP , master
secret key MSK, master public key MPK. For KGC, it generates the
signature/verification key pair sskKGC/svkKGC . For each data owner Ai,
it generates public/secret key pair pkAi/skAi and signature/verification
key pair sskAi/svkAi . For each data users Bj , it generates public/secret
key pair pkBj/skBj and signature/verification key pair sskBj/svkBj . It
also generates secret keys SK1 and SK2 for CP and CSP, respectively.
• AuthSingle(A1, B, V P, sskA1). When a data user B requests the search
right from data owner A1 within a valid time period V P , the single au-
thorization algorithm AuthSingle takes (A1, B, V P, sskA1) as inputs, and
outputs an authorization certificate CERA1,B (with certificate number
CN). It also outputs an authorization public/secret key pair pkΣ/skΣ.
• RevokeSingle(A1, B,CN, sskA1). When A1 wants to withdraw the au-
thorization certificate CERA1,B (with certificate number CN), the single
revocation algorithm RevokeSingle takes (A1, B,CN, sskA1) as inputs and
outputs a revocation certificate RVKA1,B .
• AuthMultiple(CERA1,B , · · · , CERAm,B , sskKGC). When a data user B
requests the search right from data owners AS = (A1, · · · , Am), the mul-
tiple authorization algorithm AuthSingle takes as inputs the certificates
(CERA1,B , · · · , CERAm,B) and KGC’s signature key sskKGC . It outputs
an authorization certificate CERAS,B (with certificate number CN). It
also outputs an authorization public/secret key pair pkΣ/skΣ.
• RevokeMultiple(A1, B, CN, sskA1). When KGC wants to withdraw the au-
thorization certificate CERAS,B (with certificate number CN), the mul-
14
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tiple revocation algorithm RevokeMultiple takes (AS, B,CN, sskKGC) as
inputs and outputs a revocation certificate RVKAS,B .
• Enc(pkA,M, (kw1, · · · , kwn1), (α1, · · · , αn1)). The inputs of encryption
algorithm Enc are data owner A’s public key pkA, the file M , the ex-
tracted keywords (kw1, · · · , kwn1) and the corresponding keyword weights
(α1, · · · , αn1), it outputs the file ciphertext C and encrypted index EI.
• Trapdoor((qw1, · · · , qwn), pkB , sskB , CER). The inputs of trapdoor gen-
eration algorithm Trapdoor are the query keywords (qw1, · · · , qwn), data
user B’s public key pkB and signature key sskB , and the authorization
certificate CER (CERA,B in single data owner scenario, CERAS,B in
multiple data owner scenario). It generates a trapdoor TK and outputs a
search query Υ.
• Test(Υ,EI, SK1, SK2, pkΣ, svkB). The inputs of the test algorithm Test
are the search query Υ from data user B, the encrypted index EI, the
secret key SK1 of CP, the secret key SK2 of CSP, the authorization
public key pkΣ and data user B’s verification key svkB . It outputs the
([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ , [ID
∗]pkΣ), where u
∗ indicates the search result, s∗ indi-
cates the relevance score and ID∗ is the file identity.
• Dec(([u∗]pkΣ , [s∗]pkΣ , [ID∗]pkΣ), skΣ, C). The inputs of the decryption al-
gorithm are the test results ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ , [ID
∗]pkΣ), the authorization
secret key skΣ and the ciphertext C. The algorithm outputs the file M .
3.3. Attack Model
We adopt the attack model in [19, 20]. In particular, we assume that KGC
is a fully trusted entity, CP and CSP are ”honest-but-curious” who are honest
to execute the protocols but curious with user data. An adversary A∗ is defined
in this attack model to obtain information about the plaintext of data owners’
documents and data users’ search results. A∗ has the following capabilities.
(1) A∗ could eavesdrop on all communications.
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(2) A∗ could compromise CP and try to get the plaintext from the encrypted
files sent by data owners’ and CSP.
(3) A∗ could compromise CSP and try to obtain the plaintext from the ci-
phertext sent by CP in the interactive protocol.
(4) A∗ could compromise data owners or data users (except the challenge
user) and get their privileges with the aim of getting the challenge user’s
plaintext information.
However, the attacker A∗ is not allowed to compromise: (1) CP and CSP
at the same time, and (2) the challenge user. These are typical restrictions in
security protocols [9].
3.4. Security Model
Here we recall the security model for securely realizing an ideal functionality
in the presence of non-colluding semi-honest adversaries [12, 13, 16, 18]. For
simplicity, we do it for the specific scenario of our functionality, which involve
the system user (a.k.a ”D1”), and two servers CP (a.k.a ”S1”) and CSP (a.k.a
”S2”). We refer the readers to [13] for the general case definitions.
Let P = (D1, S1, S2) be the set of all protocol parties. We consider three
kinds of adversaries (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) that corrupt D1, S1 and S2, respectively.
In the real world, D1 runs on input x and y (with additional auxiliary inputs zx
and zy), while S1 and S2 receive auxiliary inputs z1 and z2. Let H ⊆ P be the
set of honest parties. Then, for every P ∈ H, let outP be the output of party
P , whereas if P is corrupted, i.e. P ∈ P\H, then outP denotes the view of P
during the protocol Π.
For every P ∗ ∈ P, the partial view of P ∗ in a real-world execution of protocol
Π in the presence of adversaries A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) is defined as
REALP
∗
Π,A,H,z(κ, x, y) = {outP : P ∈ H} ∪ outP∗ ,
where κ ∈ N is the security parameter.
In the ideal world, there is an ideal functionality f for a function f and the
parties interact only with f. Here, the challenge user sends x and y to f. If any
16
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
of x or y is ⊥, then f returns ⊥. Finally, f returns f(x, y) to the challenge user.
As before, let H ⊆ P be the set of honest parties. Then, for every P ∈ H, let
outP be the output returned by f to party P , whereas if P is corrupted, outP
is the same value returned by P .
For every P ∗ ∈ P, the partial view of P ∗ in an ideal-world execution in the
presence of independent simulators Sim = (SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2) is defined as
IDEALP
∗
f,Sim,H,z(κ, x, y) = {outP : P ∈ H} ∪ outP∗ .
Informally, a protocol Π is considered secure against non-colluding semi-
honest adversaries if it partially emulates, in the real world, an execution of f
in the ideal world. More formally,
Definition 2. Let f be a deterministic functionality among parties in P. Let
H ⊆ P be the subset of honest parties in P. We say that Π securely realizes
f if there exists a set Sim = (SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2) of PPT transformations
(where SimD1 = SimD1(AD1) and so on) such that for all semi-honest PPT
adversaries A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2), for all inputs x, y and auxiliary inputs z, and
for all parties P ∈ P it holds
{REALP∗Π,A,H,z(κ, x, y)}κ∈N
c≈ {IDEALP∗f,SIM,H,z(κ, x, y)}κ∈N,
where
c≈ denotes computational indistinguishability.
4. System Architecture
In this section, we describe the system architecture, including system initial-
ization, user management, a unified index structure, and a high level description
of the system operational flowchart (see Figure 3.) The system supports two
broad classes of queries, range queries and boolean queries. Detailed operations
for range queries are given in Section 5, while those for boolean queries are given
in Section 6. Throughout the rest of the paper, we denote g a generator of order
ord(g) = (p − 1)(q − 1)/2, assume all the exponents are taken from ZN , and
omit mod N2, e.g., we write gr mod N2 as gr.
17
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
'DWD2ZQHU
&3 &63'DWDXVHU
)LOH
.H\ZRUGZHLJKWV
.H\ZRUGV
(QFU\SWHG)LOH
(QFU\SWHG,QGH[
(QFU\SW
2XWVRXUFH
4XHU\.H\ZRUGV
3UHIHUHQFHVFRUHV
7UDSGRRU*HQHUDWLRQ 7UDSGRRU
6HDUFK4XHU\
7HVW5DQN
7HVW5HVXOW>X@
5HOHYDQFH6FRUH>V@
7RSN5HVXOWV
5HWXUQ
Figure 3: System Flowchart
The basic idea of the system is introduced below. In Section 4.1, KGC setups
the system, and generates the public parameter, master secret/public key for
the whole system. KGC also generates public/secret key pair for data owner
and data users. The master secret key of the system is split into two parts,
which are respectively sent to CP and CSP as secret keys.
In Section 4.2, the search authorization are authorized to data users and
two application scenarios are discussed. In the single data owner scenario, the
data user requests search right from a single data owner. The data owner gen-
erates a search authorization certificate and an authorization secret/public key
pair, which are sent to the data user. In the multiple data owner scenario, the
data user wants to simultaneously search on multiple data owner’s encrypted
data. He firstly requests the search authorization from each individual data
owner. Then, he submits the obtained authorization certificates to KGC. Based
on the authorization certificates from each individual data owners, KGC gen-
erates a simultaneously search authorization certificate and an authorization
secret/public key pair, which are sent to the data user. In both scenarios, the
certificate revocation mechanisms are provided.
In Section 4.3, the data owner extracts keywords from the EHR file and
sets keyword weights. The keywords, weights and EHR file are encrypted and
18
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uploaded to CP. In Section 4.4, the data user designates the query keywords and
the preference scores (for each query keywords), and generates a query trapdoor
for them. The data user submits the query trapdoor, search authorization
certificate and a signature to the CP to issue a search request.
In Section 4.5, CP verifies the certificate and the signature to prevent unau-
thorized data access. If the verifications are valid, CP and CSP interacts to
execute the test protocols. The test results are encrypted and unknown to both
CP and CSP to enhance the privacy protection. Then, the test results are re-
turned to the data user. In Section 4.6, the data user utilizes the authorization
secret key to decrypt the retrieval results to get the match plaintext EHRs.
4.1. System Setup
KGC runs the system setup algorithm Setup to generate the parameters. It
executes KeyGen algorithm of PCTD and creates the system public parameter
PP = (g,N), master secret key MSK = λ, master public key MPK = gλ,
data owner Ai’s public/secret key pair pkAi = g
θi , skAi = θi and data user Bj ’s
public/secret key pair pkBj = g
θj , skBj = θj . The MSK is randomly split to
SK1 = λ1 and SK2 = λ2, which are the secret keys of CP and CSP, respectively.
We denote SEnc/SDec as symmetric encryption and decryption operations
(with key space K) and Sig/V erify as signature and verification operations.3
KGC generates a signature/verification key pair for itself, which is denoted as
sskKGC/svkKGC . Moreover, for each data owner Ai, KGC generates a signa-
ture/verification key pair sskAi/svkAi . For each data user Bj , KGC generates
a signature/verification key pair sskBj/svkBj . Note that the verification keys
are public in the system and the signature keys are kept secret by the corre-
sponding individuals. Furthermore, we also use two cryptographically secure
hash function H1, H2, denote as H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZN and H2 : ZN → K.
3The concrete algorithms will not be specified in this paper.
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4.2. User Authorization and Revocation
4.2.1. Single Data Owner Scenario
Suppose data user B request the search right from data owner A1 within a
valid time period V P (such as V P = “20170501-20171201”). Data owner A1
runs AuthSingle algorithm to generate an authorization certificate CERA1,B as
〈cer = (A1, B,CN, V P, pkΣ), Sig(cer, sskA1)〉,
where CN is the certificate number, the authorization public key pkΣ = g
skΣ ,
and the authorization secret key skΣ = H1(A1, B,CN, sskA1). skΣ is secretly
sent to the user B and the certificate is made public. The certificate is invalid
when V P expires.
A1 runs RevokeSingle algorithm to withdraw the user B’s search privilege
within V P . a revocation certificate RVKA1,B is generated as
〈rvk = (revoke,A1, B,CN), Sig(rvk, sskA1)〉,
which is made public in the system.
4.2.2. Multiple Data Owner Scenario
Let AS = (A1, · · · , Am) be a data owner set. Suppose the user B request
the simultaneous search privilege on AS’s documents. The data user B firstly
requests the authorization certificates CERAi,B (1 ≤ i ≤ m) from each data
owner. Then, the user B requests the certificate from KGC. Receiving the
request, KGC runs Authmultiple algorithm to calculate the valid period V PΣ =
V P1
⋂ · · ·⋂V Pm and create CERAS,B as
〈cer = (KGC,AS, B, CN, V PΣ, pkΣ), Sig(cer, sskKGC)〉,
where the authorization public key pkΣ = g
skΣ , and the authorization secret
key skΣ = H1(KGC,B,CN,MSK). skΣ is secretly sent to the user B and the
certificate is made public.
KGC runs RevokeMultiple algorithm to withdraw the user B’s search privi-
lege within V PΣ. a revocation certificate RVKAS,B is generated as
〈rvk = (revoke,KGC,AS, B,CN), Sig(rvk, sskKGC)〉.
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which is made public in the system.
4.3. Encryption
Suppose a fileM of data ownerA ∈ AS is to be outsourced. Let (kw1, · · · , kwn1)
be the keywords that are extracted from M and (α1, · · · , αn1) are the cor-
responding keyword weights. The data owner A runs the encryption algo-
rithm Enc and calculates KWi = ([kwi]pkA , [αi]pkA) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 and
KW = (KW1, · · · ,KWn1).
Then, data owner A randomly selects K ∈ ZN as the file encryption key
and encrypts it to [K]pkA . The file M is encrypted to C = SEnc(M,K
′), where
K ′ = H2(K) ∈ K. Then, the encrypted index EI = (KW, [ID]pkA , [K]pkA) and
file ciphertext C are sent to CP.
4.4. Trapdoor Generation
The data user B runs trapdoor algorithm Trapdoor to generate the search
trapdoor. Versatile search patterns are supported in our system, which are
shown in Table 2. The next sections concretely introduce how to construct
different trapdoors.
Let qw be the query keyword and β be the preference score of qw. The
encryption of qw and β is denoted as QW = ([qw]pkB , [β]pkB ). The query
trapdoor is denoted as TK.
If the data user B wants to search over data owner A’s encrypted documents,
he submits to cloud server:
〈Υ = (TK,CERA,B), Sig(Υ, sskB)〉.
If the data user B wants to simultaneously search over AS’s encrypted doc-
uments, he submits to cloud server:
〈Υ = (TK,CERAS,B), Sig(Υ, sskB)〉.
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Table 2: Query Types
Query Query Query Test
Type Formula (F) Trapdoor Protocol
Range
kw ≤ qw {F, QW} SLE
kw < qw {F, QW} SLT
kw ≥ qw {F, QW} SGE
kw > qw {F, QW} SGT
qw1 ≤ kw ≤ qw2 {F, QW1, QW2} SRT1
qw1 ≤ kw < qw2 {F, QW1, QW2} SRT2
qw1 < kw ≤ qw2 {F, QW1, QW2} SRT3
qw1 < kw < qw2 {F, QW1, QW2} SRT4
{(qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤ qw2) ∧ (qw3 < kw2 ≤ qw4)}∧ {(kw3 ≥ qw5) ∨ (kw3 < qw6)}∧ {¬(qw7 ≤ kw4 < qw8)}
{F, QW1, · · · , QW8} MRT
Single
Keyword
qw ∈ {kw1, · · · , kwn1} {F, QW} SKS
Equality kw = qw {F, QW} SET
AND ∧(qw1, · · · , qwn2 ) {F, QW1, · · · , QWn2} AND
OR ∨(qw1, · · · , qwn2 ) {F, QW1, · · · , QWn2} OR
NOT ¬(qw1, · · · , qwn2 ) {F, QW1, · · · , QWn2} NOT
Boolean
{∧, (qw1,1, · · · , qw1,τ1 )}∧{∨, (qw2,1, · · · , qw2,τ2 )}∧{¬, (qw3,1, · · · , qw3,τ3 ) }
{F, QW1,1, · · · , QW3,τ3} BL
Subset kw ∈ (qw1, · · · , qwn2 ) {F, QW1, · · · , QWn2} SKS
MIX
{(qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤ qw2) ∧ (kw2 ∈ {qw5, · · · , qw7})}∧ {(kw3 < qw5) ∨ (kw3 ≥ qw3)}∧ {¬(kw4 = qw4)}
{F, QW1, · · · , QW7} MIX
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4.5. Test
The test algorithm Test is executed by CP and CSP. They deal with the
search query as following.
(1) Receiving the search query from data user B, CP firstly checks whether
the received certificate CER exists in the revocation list. If it exists, the search
query is rejected.
(2) If CER is not revoked, CP uses data owner’s verification key svkA to
verify CERA,B or KGC’s verification key svkKGC to verify CERAS,B . If the
certificate is not valid, the search query is rejected.
(3) If the submitted certificate CER is valid, CP uses B’s verification key
svkB to verify Sig(Υ, sskB). This verification ensures that the query trapdoor
TK and the certificate CER is not tempered by the attacker, and the search
query is indeed submitted by B.
(4) If the signature Sig(Υ, sskB) is valid, CP and CSP execute the corre-
sponding test protocols (shown in Table 2) to calculate the results.
All the test protocols output the encrypted tuple ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ , [ID
∗]pkΣ),
where u∗ indicates the search result, s∗ indicates the relevance score and [ID∗]pkΣ
equals SAD([ID∗]pkA , [0]pkB ).
4.6. Decryption
The decryption algorithm Dec is executed by the data user B. Receiving
the retrieval results, the data user B utilizes skΣ to decrypt u
∗, s∗, ID∗. If
u∗ = 1, it indicates that the file ID∗ is a match result; otherwise, u∗ = 0.
B ranks these relevance scores and requires the CP to return top-k results
{(Cρ1 , [Kρ1 ]pkΣ), · · · , (Cρk , [Kρk ]pkΣ)}, which have the highest relevance scores.
[Kρi ]pkΣ is obtained by calculating SAD([K]pkA , [0]pkB ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
After receiving the encrypted documents from CP, B decrypts K using skΣ
and then recovers the file M using the secret key K ′ = H2(K).
Remark : In our system, CP has to return the search result of all documents
to user, which brings a large communication cost when the file number is large.
A method to deal with this problem is to let the CP directly rank the search
23
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
result utilizing the privacy-preserving top-k protocol in [17], and returns these
results to user. It reduces the transmission overhead between CP and data user,
but increases the calculation overhead of CP and CSP. The readers can choose
one of the two methods according to the real application scenario.
Note : To simplify the representation, let A be a data owner in set AS =
(A1, · · · , Am) and B be the data user in the rest of this paper. More specifically,
since there are a lot of test protocols in Section 5-6, we use A to represent any
data owner in AS. A data user B can use one trapdoor to search over multiple
data owner’s documents when A is substituted by any Ai ∈ AS.
5. Range Search
In this subsection, we deal with various kinds of range queries listed in
Table 2. Let us recall the notation defined in Section 4. The encryption of
the extracted keyword kw and the keyword weight α is denoted as KW =
([kw]pkA , [α]pkA); the encryption of the query keyword qw and the preference
score β is denoted as QW = ([qw]pkB , [β]pkB ). In the following protocols, sup-
pose the encrypted keyword index be KW if there is no other special explana-
tion.
5.1. Secure Less or Equal Protocol (SLE)
The data user B generates a query formula F : kw ≤ qw and the query
trapdoor TK = {F , QW}, which is sent to CP for search query. Given [kw]pkA
and [qw]pkB , the secure less or equal protocol (SLE) outputs ([u
∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ)
to show the relationship between kw and qw (i.e. kw ≤ qw or kw > qw).
We require L(kw),L(qw) < L(N)/8 to make the protocol properly work. The
description of the SLE protocol is as follows.
Step 1: CP calculates
[kw′]pkA = ([kw]pkA)
2 = [2kw]pkA .
[qw′]pkB = ([qw]pkB )
2 · [1]pkB = [2qw + 1]pkB ;
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CP chooses random numbers r1 and r2, s.t. L(r1) < L(N)/4−1 and L(r2) <
L(N)/8. Then, CP flips a coin s ∈ {0, 1} randomly. CP and CSP jointly execute
the following operations.
If s = 1, [γ]pkΣ ← SAD(([qw′]pkB )r1 , ([kw′]pkA)N−r1).
If s = 0, [γ]pkΣ ← SAD(([kw′]pkA)r1 , ([qw′]pkB )N−r1).
Then, CP calculates l = [γ]pkΣ · [r2]pkΣ and l′ = PD1SK1(l) and sends (l, l′)
to CSP.
Step 2: CSP decrypts l′′ = PD2SK2(l, l
′). If L(l′′) > L(N)/2, CSP denotes
u′ = 0 and u′ = 1 otherwise. Then, CSP uses pkΣ to encrypt u′, and sends
[u′]pkΣ to CP.
Step 3: Once [u′]pkΣ is received, CP computes as follows: if s = 1, CP de-
notes [u∗]pkΣ = CR([u
′]pkΣ); otherwise, CP computes [u
∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ ·([u′]pkΣ)N−1 =
[1− u′]pkΣ . CP sets [s∗]pkΣ = [u∗]pkΣ .
If u∗ = s∗ = 1, it indicates kw ≤ qw; otherwise, u∗ = s∗ = 0.
5.2. Secure Greater or Equal Protocol (SGE)
The data user B generates TK = {F , QW} as the the query trapdoor, where
F : kw ≥ qw is the query formula. Given [kw]pkA and [qw]pkB , the secure
greater or equal protocol (SGE) outputs outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ) to show the
relationship between kw and qw (i.e. kw ≥ qw or kw < qw). We require
L(kw),L(qw) < L(N)/8 to make the protocol work properly. The description
of the SGE protocol is as follows.
Step 1: CP calculates
[kw′]pkA = ([kw]pkA)
2 · [1]pkA = [2kw + 1]pkA ;
[qw′]pkB = ([qw]pkB )
2 = [2qw]pkB .
CP chooses random numbers r1 and r2, s.t. L(r1) < L(N)/4−1 and L(r2) <
L(N)/8. Then, CP flips a coin s ∈ {0, 1} randomly. CP and CSP jointly execute
the following operations.
If s = 1, [γ]pkΣ ← SAD(([kw′]pkA)r1 , ([qw′]pkB )N−r1).
If s = 0, [γ]pkΣ ← SAD(([qw′]pkB )r1 , ([kw′]pkA)N−r1).
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Then, CP calculates l = [γ]pkΣ · [r2]pkΣ and l′ = PD1SK1(l) and sends (l, l′)
to CSP.
Step 2 and Step 3 are the same as in SLE protocol.
If u∗ = s∗ = 1, it indicates kw ≥ qw; otherwise, u∗ = s∗ = 0.
5.3. Secure Greater Than Protocol (SGT)
The data user B generates TK = {F , QW} as the the query trapdoor, where
F : kw > qw. Given [kw]pkA and [qw]pkB with kw, qw ≥ 0, the secure greater or
than protocol (SGT) outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ) to show the relationship between
kw and qw (i.e. kw > qw or kw ≤ qw). We require L(kw),L(qw) < L(N)/8
to make the protocol work properly. The description of the SGT protocol is as
follows.
Step 1 and Step 2 are the same as in SLE protocol.
Step 3: Once [u′]pkΣ is received, CP computes as follows: if s = 1, CP
denotes [u∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ · ([u′]pkΣ)N−1 = [1 − u′]pkΣ . otherwise, CP computes
[u∗]pkΣ = CR([u
′]pkΣ); CP sets [s
∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ .
If u∗ = s∗ = 1, it indicates kw > qw; otherwise, u∗ = s∗ = 0.
5.4. Secure Equivalence Testing Protocol (SET)
The data user B generates TK = {F , QW} as the the query trapdoor, where
F : kw = qw. Given [kw]pkA and [qw]pkB (kw, qw ≥ 0), the secure equivalent
test protocol across domains (SET) outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ) to show whether
kw = qw. We restrict L(kw),L(qw) < L(N)/8 to make the protocol work
properly. CP and CSP jointly computes
[u1]pkΣ = SLE([kw]pkA , [qw]pkB );
[u2]pkΣ = SLE([qw]pkB , [kw]pkA);
[u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ);
[s′]pkΣ = SMD([α]pkA , [β]pkB );
[s∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ · [s′]pkΣ .
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If u∗ = 1, we have kw = qw and s∗ = α · β; otherwise, u∗ = s∗ = 0.
Correctness Analysis of SET. (1) If kw = qw, we have u1 = u2 = u
∗ = 1,
s′ = α · β and s∗ = α · β. (2) If kw < qw, we have u1 = 1, u2 = 0, u∗ = 0,
s′ = α ·β and s∗ = 0. (3) If kw > qw, we have u1 = 0, u2 = 1, u∗ = 0, s′ = α ·β
and s∗ = 0.
To conclude, we have u∗ = 1 and s∗ = α · β when kw = qw; u∗ = 0 and
s∗ = 0 when kw 6= qw.
5.5. Secure Range Test Protocols (SRT)
In this subsection, we deal with four types of range quires: type-1 (qw1 ≤
kw ≤ qw2), type-2 (qw1 ≤ kw < qw2), type-3 (qw1 < kw ≤ qw2), and type-4
(qw1 < kw < qw2).
5.5.1. SRT Type-1
The data user B generates TK = {F , QW1, QW2} as the the query trapdoor,
where F : qw1 ≤ kw ≤ qw2. Secure range test type-1 protocol (SRT1) outputs
([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). CP and CSP jointly computes
[u1]pkΣ = SGE([kw]pkA , [qw1]pkB );
[u2]pkΣ = SLE([kw]pkB , [qw2]pkA);
[u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ);
[s∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ .
If the query formula F holds, [u∗]pkΣ = [s∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ ; otherwise, [u∗]pkΣ =
[s∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
Correctness Analysis of SRT1. (1) If qw1 ≤ kw ≤ qw2, we have u1 =
u2 = u
∗ = s∗ = 1. (2) If qw1 > kw, we have u1 = 0, u∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0. (3) If
kw > qw2, we have u2 = 0, u
∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0.
To conclude, we have u∗ = s∗ = 1 when qw1 ≤ kw ≤ qw2; otherwise,
u∗ = s∗ = 0.
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5.5.2. SRT Type-2
The data user B generates TK = {F , QW1, QW2} as the the query trapdoor,
where F : qw1 ≤ kw < qw2. Secure range test type-2 protocol (SRT2) outputs
([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). CP and CSP jointly computes
[u1]pkΣ = SGE([kw]pkA , [qw1]pkB );
[u2]pkΣ = SLT([kw]pkB , [qw2]pkA);
[u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ);
[s∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ .
If the query formula F holds, [u∗]pkΣ = [s∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ ; otherwise, [u∗]pkΣ =
[s∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
Correctness Analysis of SRT2. (1) If qw1 ≤ kw < qw2, we have u1 =
u2 = u
∗ = s∗ = 1. (2) If qw1 > kw, we have u1 = 0, u∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0. (3) If
kw ≥ qw2, we have u2 = 0, u∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0.
To conclude, we have u∗ = s∗ = 1 when qw1 ≤ kw < qw2; otherwise,
u∗ = s∗ = 0.
5.5.3. SRT Type-3
The data user B generates TK = {F , QW1, QW2} as the the query trapdoor,
where F : qw1 < kw ≤ qw2. Secure range test type-3 protocol (SRT3) outputs
([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). CP and CSP jointly computes
[u1]pkΣ = SGT([kw]pkA , [qw1]pkB );
[u2]pkΣ = SLE([kw]pkB , [qw2]pkA);
[u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ);
[s∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ .
If the query formula F holds, [u∗]pkΣ = [s∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ ; otherwise, [u∗]pkΣ =
[s∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
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Correctness Analysis of SRT3. (1) If qw1 < kw ≤ qw2, we have u1 =
u2 = u
∗ = s∗ = 1. (2) If qw1 ≥ kw, we have u1 = 0, u∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0. (3) If
kw > qw2, we have u2 = 0, u
∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0.
To conclude, we have u∗ = s∗ = 1 when qw1 < kw ≤ qw2; otherwise,
u∗ = s∗ = 0.
5.5.4. SRT Type-4
The data user B generates TK = {F , QW1, QW2} as the the query trapdoor,
where F : qw1 < kw < qw2. Secure range test type-4 protocol (SRT4) outputs
([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). CP and CSP jointly computes
[u1]pkΣ = SGT([kw]pkA , [qw1]pkB );
[u2]pkΣ = SLT([kw]pkB , [qw2]pkA);
[u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ);
[s∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ .
If the query formula F holds, [u∗]pkΣ = [s∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ ; otherwise, [u∗]pkΣ =
[s∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
Correctness Analysis of SRT4. (1) If qw1 < kw < qw2, we have u1 =
u2 = u
∗ = s∗ = 1. (2) If qw1 ≥ kw, we have u1 = 0, u∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0. (3) If
kw ≥ qw2, we have u2 = 0, u∗ = 0 and s∗ = 0.
To conclude, we have u∗ = s∗ = 1 when qw1 < kw < qw2; otherwise,
u∗ = s∗ = 0.
5.6. Secure Mixed Range Test Protocols (MRT)
This expressive query over encrypted data system supports mixed range
query with different comparison patterns.
Suppose the encrypted keyword index be (KW1, · · · ,KW4) and the data
user B make a mixed range query with formula F = {(qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤ qw2) ∧
(qw3 < kw2 ≤ qw4)}
∧ {(kw3 ≥ qw5)∨(kw3 < qw6)}∧ {¬(qw7 ≤ kw4 < qw8)},
where ∧,∨,¬ denotes AND, OR and NOT operations, respectively. The data user
B submits TK = {F , QW1, · · · , QW8} to CP as the query trapdoor. The secure
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mixed range test protocol (MRT) (shown in Algorithm 1) is interactively executed
by CP and CSP, and outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). If the formula F holds, it out-
puts [u∗]pkΣ = [s
∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ ; otherwise, it outputs [u
∗]pkΣ = [s
∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
Algorithm 1: Secure mixed range test protocol Domains (MRT)
Input: (KW1, · · · ,KW4), TK.
Output: ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
1 [u1]pkΣ = SRT1([kw1]pkA , [qw1]pkB , [qw2]pkB );
2 [u2]pkΣ = SRT3([kw2]pkA , [qw3]pkB , [qw4]pkB );
3 [u3]pkΣ = SGE([kw3]pkA , [qw5]pkB );
4 [u4]pkΣ = SLT([kw3]pkA , [qw6]pkB );
5 [u5]pkΣ = SRT2([kw4]pkA , [qw7]pkA , [qw8]pkB );
6 [u′5]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ · ([u5]pkΣ)1−N ;
7 [u6]pkΣ = SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ);
8 [u7]pkΣ = [u3]pkΣ · [u4]pkΣ ;
9 [u7]pkΣ = SGE([u7]pkΣ , [1]pkΣ);
10 [u8]pkΣ = SMD([u6]pkΣ , [u7]pkΣ);
11 [u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u8]pkΣ , [u
′
5]pkΣ);
12 [s∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ ;
13 Return ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
Correctness Analysis of MRT. We explain the correctness of the MRT pro-
tocol as following.
• Line 1: If qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤ qw2, we have u1 = 1; otherwise, u1 = 0.
• Line 2: If qw3 < kw2 ≤ qw4, we have u2 = 1; otherwise, u2 = 0.
• Line 3: If kw3 ≥ qw5, we have u3 = 1; otherwise, u3 = 0.
• Line 4: If kw3 < qw6, we have u4 = 1; otherwise, u4 = 0.
• Line 5: If qw7 ≤ kw4 < qw8, we have u5 = 1; otherwise, u5 = 0.
• Line 6: If ¬(qw7 ≤ kw4 < qw8), we have u′5 = 1 − u5 = 1 − 0 = 1;
otherwise, u5 = 1− u5 = 1− 1 = 0.
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• Line 7: If qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤ qw2 and (qw3 < kw2 ≤ qw4), we have u1 = u2 = 1
and u6 = u1 ·u2 = 1; otherwise, u6 = 0. It indicates that if {(qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤
qw2) ∧ (qw3 < kw2 ≤ qw4)} is true, we have u6 = 1; otherwise, u6 = 0.
• Line 8-9: If {(kw3 ≥ qw5) ∨ (kw3 < qw6)} is true, we have u7 = 1;
otherwise, u7 = 0.
• Line 10: If {(qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤ qw2) ∧ (qw3 < kw2 ≤ qw4)}
∧ {(kw3 ≥
qw5) ∨ (kw3 < qw6)} is true, we have u6 = u7 = 1 and u8 = u6 · u7 = 1;
otherwise, u8 = 0.
• Line 11: If F = {(qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤ qw2) ∧ (qw3 < kw2 ≤ qw4)}
∧ {(kw3 ≥
qw5)∨ (kw3 < qw6)}
∧ {¬(qw7 ≤ kw4 < qw8)} is true, we have u8 = u′5 =
1 and u∗ = u8 · u′5 = 1; otherwise, u∗ = 0.
Further Explanation. In the MRT protocol design, the SMD protocol is uti-
lized to execute the AND operation between formulas, and production operation
to execute the OR operation. For the NOT operation, the algorithm in Line 6
([u′5]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ · ([u5]pkΣ)1−N ) realizes the inverse calculation.
6. Boolean Search
Let KW = (KW1, · · · ,KWn1) and QW = (QW1, · · · , QWn2), n2 ≤ n1.
Next, we design several protocols to deal with “AND”, “OR”, “NOT” and
boolean queries. In the following protocols, suppose the encrypted keyword
index be KW if there is no other special explanation.
6.1. Secure Single Keyword Search Protocol (SKS)
The data user B makes a single keyword search query on keyword qw with
preference score β. The query formula is F : qw ∈ (kw1, · · · , kwn1). The data
user B submits TK = {F , QW} as the the query trapdoor.
The secure single keyword search protocol (SKS) is interactively executed
by CP and CSP, and outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ), where u
∗ indicates the search
result and s∗ indicates the relevance score. If there is one keyword kwi ∈
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(kw1, · · · , kwn1) matches the queried keyword qw, we have u∗ = 1 and s∗ =
αi · β; otherwise, u∗ = s∗ = 0. The SKS protocol is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Secure Single Keyword Search Protocol Across
Domains (SKS)
Input: KW, QW .
Output: ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
1 Initialize [u∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ ;
2 for i = 1 to |KW| do
3 [ui]pkΣ = SET([kwi]pkA , [qw]pkB );
4 [s′i]pkΣ = SMD([αi]pkA , [β]pkB );
5 [si]pkΣ = SMD([ui]pkΣ , [s
′
i]pkΣ);
6 CP calculates [u∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ · [ui]pkΣ ;
7 [s∗]pkΣ = [s
∗]pkΣ · [si]pkΣ ;
8 Return ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
Remark : SKS protocol can also be used to issue a subset query. In
subset query, the query formula is F : kw ∈ {qw1, · · · , qwn2} and B submits
TK = {F ,QW} as query trapdoor to CP. Receiving the request, CP inputs
(QW,KW ) into the SKS protocol, which outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s∗]pkΣ). If the query
formula F holds, we have u∗ = 1 and s∗ = α · βj for some j ∈ [1, n2]; otherwise,
u∗ = s∗ = 0.
6.2. Secure AND Protocol (AND)
The data user B makes a multiple keywords search query on QW with an
“AND” relationship and the query formula is F : ∧(qw1, · · · , qwn2). The data
user B generates TK = {F ,QW} as the the query trapdoor. The secure AND
protocol (AND) outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). If (kw1, · · · , kwn1) contains all the
queried keywords (qw1, · · · , qwn2), we have u∗ = 1; otherwise, u∗ = 0.
Suppose kwγj match qwj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n2. If u∗ = 1, we have s∗ =∑
1≤j≤n2 αγj ·βj ; otherwise, s∗ = 0. The AND protocol is shown in Algorithm 3,
which is jointly executed by CP and CSP.
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In this system, the test algorithm of the conjunctive keyword query is exe-
cuted by AND protocol.
Algorithm 3: Secure AND Protocol (AND)
Input: KW,QW.
Output: [u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ .
1 Initialize [u∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ ;
2 for j = 0 to |QW| do
3 ([uj ]pkΣ , [sj ]pkΣ) = SKS(KW, QWj);
4 [u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u
∗]pkΣ , [uj ]pkΣ);
5 CP calculates [s∗]pkΣ = [s
∗]pkΣ · [sj ]pkΣ ;
6 [s∗]pkΣ = SMD([u
∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ);
7 Return ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
6.3. Secure OR Protocol (OR)
The data user B makes a multiple keywords search query on QW with an
“OR” relationship and the query formula is F : ∨(qw1, · · · , qwn2). The data
user B generates TK = {F ,QW} as the the query trapdoor. The secure OR
protocol (OR) outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). If (kw1, · · · , kwn1) contains at least one
of the queried keywords (qw1, · · · , qwn2), we have u∗ = 1; otherwise, u∗ = 0.
Suppose kwγj match qwj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n3 and n3 ≤ n2. If u∗ = 1, we have
s∗ =
∑
1≤j≤n3 αγj ·βj ; otherwise, s∗ = 0. The OR protocol is shown in Algorithm
4, which is jointly executed by CP and CSP.
6.4. Secure NOT Protocol (NOT)
The data user B makes a multiple keywords search query on QW with a
“NOT” relationship and the query formula is F : ¬(qw1, · · · , qwn2). The data
user B generates TK = {F ,QW} as the the query trapdoor. The secure NOT
protocol (NOT) outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). If (kw1, · · · , kwn1) contains at least
one of the queried keywords (qw1, · · · , qwn2), we have u∗ = s∗ = 0; otherwise,
u∗ = s∗ = 1. The NOT protocol is shown in Algorithm 5, which is jointly
executed by CP and CSP.
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Algorithm 4: Secure OR Protocol (OR)
Input: KW,QW.
Output: ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
1 Initialize [u∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ ;
2 set [u′]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ ;
3 for j = 1 to |QW| do
4 ([uj ]pkΣ , [sj ]pkΣ) = SKS(KW, QWj);
5 CP calculates [u′]pkΣ = [u
′]pkΣ · [uj ]pkΣ ;
6 [s∗]pkΣ = [s
∗]pkΣ · [sj ]pkΣ ;
7 [u∗]pkΣ = SGE([u
′]pkΣ , [1]pkΣ);
8 Return ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
Algorithm 5: Secure Inverter Protocol(NOT)
Input: KW,QW.
Output: ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
1 Initialize [u∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ ;
2 for j = 1 to |QW| do
3 ([u′j ]pkΣ , [s
′
j ]pkΣ) = SKS(KW, QWj);
4 CP calculates [uj ]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ · ([u′j ]pkΣ)N−1;
5 CP calculates [u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u
∗]pkΣ , [uj ]pkΣ);
6 [s∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ ;
7 Return ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ).
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6.5. Secure Boolean Protocol (BL)
The data userB makes a boolean query on (QW1,QW2,QW3), whereQW1 =
(QW1,1, · · · , QW1,τ1), QW2 = (QW2,1, · · · , QW2,τ2), QW3 = (QW3,1, · · · , QW3,τ3),
QW1∩QW2∩QW3 = ∅ and QWj = ([qwj ]pkB , [βj ]pkB ). The boolean query for-
mula is F : {∧, (qw1,1, · · · , qw1,τ1)}
∧{∨, (qw2,1, · · · , qw2,τ2)}∧ {¬, (qw3,1, · · · , qw3,τ3) },
where ∧,∨,¬ denotes AND, OR and NOT operations, respectively. B generates
TK = {F , QW1,1, · · ·QW3,τ3} as the the query trapdoor.
The secure boolean protocol (BL) outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ) and the descrip-
tion of the BL protocol is as follows.
Step 1: CP initializes [u∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
Step 2: CP and CSP jointly calculate
([u1]pkΣ , [s1]pkΣ) = AND(KW,QW1);
([u2]pkΣ , [s2]pkΣ) = OR(KW,QW2);
([u3]pkΣ , [s3]pkΣ) = INV(KW,QW3);
[u′]pkΣ = SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ);
[u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u3]pkΣ , [u
′]pkΣ).
Step 3: CP calculates [s′]pkΣ = [s1]pkΣ · [s2]pkΣ .
Step 4: CP and CSP jointly calculate
[s∗]pkΣ = SMD([s
′]pkΣ , [u
∗]pkΣ).
6.6. MIX Boolean Search
Suppose the encrypted keyword index be (KW1, · · · ,KW4). The data user
B issues a mix boolean search query (including range, subset, equality and
boolean queries) to test whether the formula holds: F = {(qw1 ≤ kw1 ≤ qw2)∧
(kw2 ∈ {qw5, · · · , qw7})}
∧{(kw3 < qw5) ∨ (kw3 ≥ qw3)}∧ {¬(kw4 = qw4)}.
The data user B submits the query trapdoor TK = {F , QW1, · · · , QW7} to
cloud server to issue a query. Let [S]pkB = (QW5, · · · , QW7).
The MIX protocol outputs ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ). If the formula F holds, we have
[u∗]pkΣ = [s
∗]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ ; otherwise, [u
∗]pkΣ = [s
∗]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
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CP and CSP jointly calculates
[u1]pkΣ = SRT1([kw1]pkA , [qw1]pkB , [qw2]pkB );
[u2]pkΣ = SKS(KW2, [S]pkB );
[u3]pkΣ = SLT([kw3]pkA , [qw5]pkB );
[u4]pkΣ = SGE([kw3]pkA , [qw3]pkB );
[u5]pkΣ = SET([kw4]pkA , [qw4]pkA);
[u′5]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ · ([u5]pkΣ)1−N ;
[u6]pkΣ = SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ);
[u7]pkΣ = [u3]pkΣ · [u4]pkΣ ;
[u7]pkΣ = SGE([u7]pkΣ , [1]pkΣ);
[u8]pkΣ = SMD([u6]pkΣ , [u7]pkΣ);
[u∗]pkΣ = SMD([u8]pkΣ , [u
′
5]pkΣ);
[s∗]pkΣ = [u
∗]pkΣ .
7. Performance Analysis
We evaluate the computation and communication cost of our system and
the protocols on a personal computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6600T CPU
@2.70GHz, 8GB RAM and running Windows 10 64-bit operation system. We
leverage multi-thread programming method to implement the system.
7.1. Performance of Protocols
Table 3 and Table 4 show the performance of the protocols in this paper.
L(N) is the most important parameter that influence the protocol performance,
which is set to be 512, 768, 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792 and 2048 bits to test the
protocols and K2C algorithm, respectively. In practical application, it is advised
to set L(N) = 1024 to achieve 80-bit security level [1].
The performance of the SKS, AND, OR and NOT protocols depends on the values
of n1, n2, which are the keyword numbers in the encrypted index and trapdoor,
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Table 3: Computation Overhead of the Protocols
Computation Overhead (s)
N 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
K2C 0.003 0.008 0.019 0.034 0.069 0.102 0.128
SLE 0.019 0.069 0.147 0.272 0.448 0.719 1.065
SLT 0.021 0.067 0.153 0.265 0.459 0.719 1.091
SGE 0.023 0.073 0.155 0.281 0.443 0.711 1.068
SGT 0.021 0.071 0.142 0.297 0.492 0.724 1.006
SRT1 0.057 0.191 0.377 0.745 1.442 1.826 2.664
SRT2 0.055 0.158 0.384 0.711 1.183 1.853 2.688
SRT3 0.054 0.177 0.385 0.719 1.155 1.885 2.692
SRT4 0.055 0.179 0.376 0.717 1.154 1.814 2.679
MRT 0.186 0.601 1.374 2.955 4.043 6.445 9.394
SET 0.054 0.181 0.372 0.749 1.162 1.835 2.747
SKS 0.196 0.488 0.987 1.835 3.316 4.75 7.376
AND 0.238 0.555 1.099 2.057 3.888 4.951 7.619
OR 0.221 0.551 1.090 1.981 3.795 4.905 7.375
NOT 0.246 0.567 1.101 2.069 3.895 4.979 7.709
BL 0.303 0.711 1.688 3.343 6.07 8.455 12.539
MIX 0.205 0.532 1.219 2.13 4.331 5.518 7.993
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Table 4: Communication Overhead of the Protocols
Communication Overhead (KB)
N 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
SLE 0.683 0.958 1.278 1.597 1.918 2.237 2.558
SLT 0.638 0.959 1.278 1.598 1.917 2.238 2.558
SGE 0.637 0.958 1.277 1.598 1.917 2.237 2.557
SGT 0.639 0.959 1.277 1.599 1.918 2.238 2.558
SRT1 1.914 2.873 3.835 4.793 5.756 6.713 7.673
SRT2 1.915 2.872 3.838 4.798 5.752 6.715 7.675
SRT3 1.913 2.872 3.834 4.794 5.757 6.714 7.676
SRT4 1.913 2.872 3.836 4.796 5.756 6.713 7.674
MRT 10.069 15.137 20.201 25.257 30.295 35.379 40.431
SET 0.191 0.287 0.383 0.479 0.575 0.671 0.767
SKS 23.721 35.663 47.542 59.447 71.361 83.243 95.193
AND 21.445 32.193 42.946 53.712 64.461 75.232 85.951
OR 17.244 25.896 34.481 43.178 51.796 60.442 69.102
NOT 18.406 27.612 36.816 46.035 55.241 64.463 73.681
BL 21.191 31.836 42.417 53.082 63.672 74.336 84.929
MIX 33.095 49.643 66.228 82.777 99.346 115.961 132.525
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respectively. We set n1 = 6, n2 = 3 to evaluate these protocols in Tables 3-4.
We set n1 = 6 and τ1 = τ2 = τ3 = 3 for the BL protocol evaluation.
• When L(N) = 1024, the SLE protocol incurs computation cost 0.147 s
and communication cost 1.278 KB; the SLT protocol incurs computation
cost 0.153 s and communication cost 1.278 KB; the SGE protocol incurs
computation cost 0.155 s and communication cost 1.277 KB; the SGT pro-
tocol incurs computation cost 0.142 s and communication cost 1.277 KB.
It indicates that these four protocols have quite similar computation and
communication costs.
• Likely, the range query protocols SRT1-SRT4 have similar performances.
When L(N) = 1024, the SRT1 protocol incurs computation cost 0.377 s
and communication cost 3.835 KB; the SRT2 protocol incurs computation
cost 0.384 s and communication cost 3.838 KB; the SRT3 protocol incurs
computation cost 0.385 s and communication cost 3.834 KB; the SRT4
protocol incurs computation cost 0.376 s and communication cost 3.836
KB.
• The MRT protocol executes complex multi-dimensional range query oper-
ations, which incurs computation cost 1.374 s and communication cost
20.201 KB when L(N) = 1024. The SET protocol is important to evaluate
the equality of two keywords, which incurs computation cost 0.372 s and
communication cost 0.383 KB when L(N) = 1024.
• When L(N) = 1024, the SKS protocol incurs computation cost 0.987 s
and communication cost 47.542 KB; the AND protocol incurs computation
cost 1.099 s and communication cost 42.946 KB; the OR protocol incurs
computation cost 1.090 s and communication cost 34.481 KB; the NOT
protocol incurs computation cost 1.101 s and communication cost 36.816
KB.
• The BL protocol executes boolean query with AND, OR and NOT oper-
ations, which can be paralleled executed to improve the efficiency. The
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protocol incurs computation cost 1.688 s and communication cost 42.417
KB when L(N) = 1024.
• The MIX protocol issues mix query with range, subset, equality and boolean
queries, which can be paralleled executed to improve the efficiency. The
protocol incurs computation cost 1.219 s and communication cost 66.228
KB when L(N) = 1024.
Table 5: Comparison of the System Computation Overhead
Scheme
Computation Overhead (s)
Setup Encryption Trapdoor Test
Subset
[4] 1.563× 1037 1.563× 1037 2.605× 1037 2.804× 1037
Ours ≈ 0 0.027 0.147 0.987
Conjunctive
[4] 1.563× 1037 1.563× 1037 2.605× 1037 2.804× 1037
[28] 1.042× 1037 5.211× 1037 6.253× 1037 1.065× 1034
[15] ≈ 0 0.504 0.103 0.392
Ours ≈ 0 0.267 0.149 1.099
Range
[4] 1.563× 1037 1.563× 1037 2.605× 1037 2.804× 1037
[28] 1.042× 1037 5.211× 1037 6.253× 1037 1.065× 1034
[26] 3.126× 1037 1.563× 1037 2.605× 1037 5.608× 1037
Ours ≈ 0 0.027 0.056 0.377
7.2. System Performance and Comparison
In this subsection, we analyze the system performance and compare our sys-
tem with other existing public key SE schemes. Since expressive query patterns
are realized in our system, we compare the subset query, conjunctive query and
range query with different schemes. The boolean query is not compared due to
that there is no existing public key SE scheme support boolean query pattern.
In our system, we set L(N) = 1024 to achieve 80-bit security level [1].
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Table 6: Comparison of the System Storage Overhead
Scheme
Storage Overhead (KB)
|PP | |CT | |TK|
Subset
[4] 2.223× 1038 1.482× 1038 1.482× 1038
Ours 0.255 0.256 1.536
Conjunctive
[4] 2.223× 1038 1.482× 1038 1.482× 1038
[28] 3.705× 1038 2.964× 1038 1.283
[15] 0.128 0.768 0.384
Ours 0.255 1.563 0.768
Range
[4] 2.223× 1038 1.482× 1038 0.640× 1038
[28] 3.705× 1038 2.964× 1038 1.283
[26] 4.446× 1038 1.482× 1038 1.280× 1038
Ours 0.255 0.256 0.512
Up to date, Boneh’s scheme [4] is the most expressive public key SE scheme,
which supports subset query, conjunctive query and range query. Wen’s scheme
[28] realizes conjunctive and range query. Liu’s scheme [15] only enables con-
junctive keyword search and Wang’s scheme [26] only supports range query. Our
system is compared with these schemes in Table 5 and Table 6, where |PP |, |CT |
and |TK| represent the size of public parameter, ciphertext and trapdoor, re-
spectively. For different query types, different parameters are set for the diverse
comparisons, which will be specified in the following analysis.
In Table 5, the computation overhead of Setup algorithm in our system is
approximately 0 s since KGC consumes only 0.09 ms to generate the system
public parameter and master public/secret pair. KGC spends only 0.04 ms to
generate a public/secret key pair for each user.
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7.2.1. Subset Query Comparison
The subset query is rarely supported in the existing public key SE schemes.
Boneh’s scheme [4] leverages hidden vector encryption (HVE) mechanism to
design the subset query function. In [4], a vector V1 in the form of {0, 1}n is
utilized to store the element x and x < n. The x-th position of V1 is set to
1 and the other positions are set to 0. A vector V2 in the form of {0, ∗}n to
store the set S. The star ∗ plays the role of a wildcard or “don’t care” value
[4]. Suppose S = {2, 3, n}. Then, the 2nd, 3rd and n-th positions of V2 are set
to ∗ and the other positions are set to 0. The vectors V1 and V2 are encrypted
using “Encryption” and “Trapdoor Generation” algorithms to hide the vector
information, respectively.
A notable drawback of HVE is that the computation complexity rapidly
grows with the domain size n. In our system performance evaluation, we set
L(N) = 1024 to achieve 80-bit security level. In SKS protocol, the bit length of
keyword value should be less than L(N)/8 = 128 to enable the protocol work
properly. Let the bit length of keyword value not exceed 127 and the keyword
domain size be n = 2127. In [4], the computation and storage overheads linearly
grow with n, which is astronomical as shown in Tables 5-6. Boneh et al. suggest
to use bloom filter when the domain size n is large. However, false positive
probability is introduced by bloom filter [2].
In the comparison, we set the S contain three elements and let the domain
size be n = 2127. The comparison shows that our system is more efficient in
computation and storage overhead and the system does not introduces false
probability.
7.2.2. Conjunctive Query Comparison
The conjunctive keyword query function in our system is compared with
that in schemes [4, 28, 15]. In the comparison, six keywords are extracted and
encrypted in the index and three keywords are queried for conjunctive search.
The test algorithm of conjunctive query is executed by AND protocol in our
system. Since the schemes [4, 28] are constructed based on HVE technology,
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the computation and storage overheads are astronomical when the domain size
is n = 2127. The scheme [15] has better performance than ours since it merely
realizes conjunctive search function.
7.2.3. Range Query Comparison
The range query function in our system is compared with that in schemes
[4, 28, 26], which supports “ ≤ ” and “ ≥ ” comparisons. The query patterns
kw < qw, kw > qw, qw1 ≤ kw < qw2, qw1 < kw ≤ qw2, qw1 < kw < qw2 are
not realized in [4, 28, 26] since these queries contains “ > ” or “ < ” comparisons.
To simplify the comparison, we utilize the qw1 ≤ kw < qw2 as the range query
type.
Since the schemes [4, 28, 26] are all constructed based on HVE method, their
performances are rather poor. Our system not only realizes efficient computa-
tion and storage overhead, but also supports more flexible range query types.
8. Security Analysis
The protocols are proved secure in the security model defined in Section 3.4.
Later on, the security of this expressive query over encrypted data system is
analyzed.
8.1. Protocols Security Proof
Theorem 1. The SLE protocol is secure to test the relationship on two ciphertext
against the attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) defined in the security model.
Proof. We construct the following independent simulators
(SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2).
SimD1 receives kw and qw as input and simulates AD1 as following. It
generates the ciphertext [kw]pkA and [qw]pkB of kw and qw, respectively. The
entire view of AD1 is the encrypted data, which in both real and ideal executions
are indistinguishable due to the semantic security of PCTD.
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SimS1 simulates AS1 as following. It randomly selects kˆw, qˆw ∈ ZN and
encrypts them to [kˆw]pkA and [qˆw]pkB . Then, it computes [
ˆkw′]pkB = ([kˆw]pkB )
2
and [ ˆqw′]pkA = ([qˆw]pkA)
2 · [1]pkA . According to the randomly flipped coin s ∈
{0, 1}, it inputs them into SimSADS1 in Ref. [18] and gets l. Using PD1 algorithm,
it computes l′. Then, SimS1 sends (l, l
′) and the intermediate encrypted data
of SimSADS1 to AS1 . If AS1 replies with ⊥, then SimS1 outputs ⊥. The semantic
security of PCTD ensures that AS1 ’s view is indistinguishable from its view in
the real world execution.
SimS2 simulates AS2 as following. It selects random uˆ′ ∈ {0, 1} and en-
crypts it to [uˆ′]pkΣ , which is sent to AS2 . If AS2 replies with ⊥, SimS2 outputs
⊥. This is ensured in real world due to the semantic security of PCTD. In both
real and ideal world, the views of AS2 are indistinguishable. 
Theorem 2. The SLE protocol is secure against the adversary A∗ defined in
the attack model.
Proof. The adversary A∗ is assumed to have the following abilities.
(1) A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary and eavesdrop all the commu-
nications to get the transmitted information. As A∗ is assumed to be an
outside adversary, A∗ cannot get data owner A’s private key skA, data
user B’s private key skB and B’s authorization secret key skΣ. A∗ also
cannot obtain CP’s partial strong key SK1 and CSP’s partial strong key
SK2.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel between the system user
and CP, A∗ could get the encrypted keywords [kw]pkA and [qw]pkB that
are transmitted at the beginning of the SLE protocol, and the encrypted
results ([u∗]pkΣ , [s
∗]pkΣ) that are transmitted at the end of the protocol.
Since [kw]pkA , [qw]pkB , [u
∗]pkΣ and [s
∗]pkΣ are encrypted using the PCTD
algorithm, the adversary A∗ cannot recover kw, qw, u∗, s∗ due to the IND-
CPA security of PCTD.
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If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel between CP and CSP, A∗
could get (l, l′) in the end of step 1, and [u′]pkΣ in the end of step 2.
In the SLE protocol, l = [γ]pkΣ · [r2]pkΣ = [γ + r2]pkΣ and l′ = PD1SK1(l).
Since the adversary A∗ does know the data owner B’s authorization secret
key skΣ and the CSP’s partial strong key SK2, A∗ cannot recover the
plaintexts γ + r2. Then, A∗ cannot deduce the plaintexts kw, qw and
their relationship.
(2) A∗ is assumed to compromise CP and get CP’s partial strong key SK1.
But A∗ cannot get CSP’s partial strong key SK2. A∗ also cannot get
data owner A’s private key skA, data user B’s private key skB and B’s
authorization secret key skΣ.
In step 1 of the SLE protocol, A∗ obtains [kw]pkA and [qw]pkB from the
data owner A and data user B. A∗ cannot recover kw nor qw without the
secret keys skA, skB . In step 3, A∗ obtains [u′]pkΣ from CSP. Since skΣ is
unknown, A∗ cannot derive u′.
(3) A∗ is assumed to compromise CSP and get CSP’s partial strong key SK2.
But A∗ cannot get CP’s partial strong key SK1. A∗ also cannot get
data owner A’s private key skA, data user B’s private key skB and B’s
authorization secret key skΣ.
In step 2 of the SLE protocol, A∗ obtains (l, l′) transmitted by CP. Since
CSP’s partial strong key SK2 is known, A∗ decrypts
l′′ = PD2SK2(l, l
′) = γ + r2.
If L(l′′) > L(N)/2, CSP sets u′ = 0 and u′ = 1 otherwise. Although A∗
can get γ + r2 and u
′, A∗ cannot deduce the relationship of size between
kw and qw. The reason is explained below.
In step 1, the CP flips random coins s ∈ {0, 1} and calculates [γ]pkΣ
according to s.
If s = 1,
[γ]pkΣ = SAD(([qw
′]pkB )
r1 , ([kw′]pkA)
N−r1)
= [r1(qw
′ − kw′)]pkΣ .
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If s = 0,
[γ]pkΣ = SAD(([kw
′]pkA)
r1 , ([qw′]pkB )
N−r1)
= [r1(kw
′ − qw′)]pkΣ .
Then, the adversary A∗ gets
l′′ = γ + r2 =
 r1(qw
′ − kw′) + r2, if s = 1,
r1(kw
′ − qw′) + r2, if s = 0.
Due to the randomness of s, the adversary A∗ cannot deduce the relation-
ship of size between kw′ and qw′. Thus, A∗ cannot deduce the relationship
of size between kw and qw.
(4) A∗ is assumed to be a set of collude malicious users (B1, · · · , Bn) (except
the challenge user B∗), and A∗ gets their secret keys (skB1 , · · · , skBn). A∗
wants to get the information that belongs to the challenge user B∗. Sup-
pose the compared ciphertexts are ([kw]pkA , [qw]pkB∗ ), and the returned
results are ([u∗]pkΣ∗ , [s
∗]pkΣ∗ ), where pkΣ∗ is the authorize public key from
data owner A to challenge user B∗. Since the user’s secret keys are inde-
pendently generated, the adversary A∗ cannot utilize (skB1 , · · · , skBn) to
deduce the challenge user B∗’s secret key skB∗ . A∗ also cannot get the
authorization secret key skΣ∗ . Thus, A∗ cannot recover qw nor (u∗, s∗).
According to the above analysis, the SLE protocol is secure against the ad-
versary A∗ defined in the attack model. 
The security proofs of SGE and SGT protocols are similar to that of the SLE
against the semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) defined
in the security model, and against the attacker A∗ defined in the attack model.
Theorem 3. The SET protocol is secure to test the equality on two keyword
ciphertext against the (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) defined in
the security model.
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Proof. SET protocol just calls SLE and SMD as subprotocols and all data
are encrypted using PCTD encryption. Since SLE and SMD protocols are proved
secure in Theorem 1 and [18], the SET protocol is also secure in the presence of
attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) defined in the security model. 
Theorem 4. The SET protocol is secure against the adversary A∗ defined in
the attack model.
Proof. SET protocol just calls SLE and SMD as subprotocols and all data are
encrypted using PCTD encryption. Since SLE and SMD protocols are proved se-
cure in Theorem 2 and [18], the SET protocol is also secure against the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model. 
The security proofs of SRT1, SRT2, SRT3, SRT4 and MRT protocols are similar
to that of the SET protocol against the semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers
A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) defined in the security model, and against the attacker A∗
defined in the attack model.
Theorem 5. The SKS protocol is secure to test the equality on two keyword ci-
phertext against the semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2)
defined in the security model.
Proof. SKS protocol just calls SET and SMD as subprotocols and all data
are encrypted using PCTD encryption. Since SET and SMD protocols are proved
secure in Theorem 3 and [18], the SKS protocol is also secure in the presence of
attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) defined in the security model. 
Theorem 6. The SKS protocol is secure against the adversary A∗ defined in
the attack model.
Proof. SKS protocol just calls SET and SMD as subprotocols and all data are
encrypted using PCTD encryption. Since SET and SMD protocols are proved se-
cure in Theorem 4 and [18], the SKS protocol is also secure against the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model. 
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Theorem 7. The AND protocol is secure to test the equality on two keyword ci-
phertext against the semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2)
defined in the security model.
Proof. AND protocol just calls SKS and SMD as subprotocols and all data
are encrypted using PCTD encryption. Since SKS and SMD protocols are proved
secure in Theorem 5 and [18], the AND protocol is also secure in the presence of
attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) defined in the security model. 
Theorem 8. The AND protocol is secure against the adversary A∗ defined in
the attack model.
Proof. AND protocol just calls SKS and SMD as subprotocols and all data are
encrypted using PCTD encryption. Since SKS and SMD protocols are proved se-
cure in Theorem 6 and [18], the AND protocol is also secure against the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model. 
The security proofs of OR, NOT, BL and MIX protocols are similar to that
of AND against the semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2)
defined in the security model, and against the attacker A∗ defined in the attack
model.
8.2. System Security Proof
The security of our system is analyzed as following.
• Key Generation: The intractability of discrete logarithm problem guar-
antees the security of user’s secret key. The security of PCTD [18] ensures
the privacy of CP and CSP’s secret keys. Since CP and CSP are assumed
not to collude, the security of master secret key is ensured by the hardness
of big integer factoring problem.
• User Authorization and Revocation: If the signature scheme Sig is
cryptographic strong unforgeable and user’s secret keys are not leaked,
the authorization and revocation certificates can not be forged.
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• Encryption: Since the keywords and keyword weights are encrypted by
PCTD algorithm, the privacy of encrypted index is guaranteed by the
security of PCTD. Suppose the symmetric encryption algorithm SEnc is
cryptographically secure. Then, the privacy of encrypted file is ensured.
• Query: The security of PCTD ensures the privacy of the generated query
trapdoor.
• Search: According to the query type, different protocols shown in Table
2 are utilized to execute the search algorithm, which are proved secure
above.
The, the attack model in Section 3.3 is utilized to prove that our system is
secure against adversary A∗.
(1) Assume A∗ eavesdrop all the communications between the data user and
CP, and all the information between CP and CSP. Since all the data are
encrypted by PCTD, A∗ still can not deduce any plaintext content.
(2-3) Assume A∗ compromise CP or CSP and get λ1 or λ2. However, A∗ can
not compromise CP and CSP at the same time and A∗ can not recover the
master secret key λ. Even though A∗ compromises CSP, A∗ is unable to
deduce useful information from the protocols since the intermediate data
transmitted between CP and CSP are blinded by a random number using
the ”blinding technology” [23].
(4) Assume A∗ compromise data owners or users (except the challenge user)
and obtain the secret keys. A∗ is unable to decrypt the challenge user’s
ciphertext since the secret keys of different users are randomly selected.
Furthermore, we analyze that off-line keyword guessing (KG) attack is not
applicable to our system. In KG attack [6, 32], the attackers observe that the
commonly used keywords are frequently selected from a relatively small keyword
set than passwords, and the well-known keywords are frequently utilized in the
search query. Then, the malicious adversary tries to guess several candidate
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keywords and verify his guess is correct or not in an off-line manner using the
test algorithm.
In the conclusion [6], the authors pointed out that “The vulnerabilities of
keyword guessing attack come from that trapdoors are simply generated by just
combining keywords and secret key. That is, any insider/outsider attacker can
relate the combination with the public keys by using pairing operation, which
finally cause off-line keyword guessing attack. It is not an easy task to remove a
redundancy from trapdoor queries and public keys to be strong against off-line
keyword guessing attacks still keeping its original security.”
In a lot of searchable encryption schemes, the bilinear pairing computation
are utilized in the scheme construction. The inside/outside attacker is able to
remove some redundant element in the trapdoor and then utilizes the property
of bilinear pairing map to test whether the guessed keywords is correct. In our
system, the proposed secure query over encrypted data mechanism does not rely
on bilinear pairing computation. The foundation of our system is the PCTD
cryptographic system, which is completely different from the bilinear map. The
attacker cannot make use of the property of bilinear pairing to launch off-line
KG attack on our system.
Furthermore, the successful of KG attack completely relies on that the ad-
versary could verify the correctness of his guess. If the adversary cannot get
the test result, he could not be succeed in guessing keyword. In our system,
the test result is an encrypted ciphertext [u∗]pkΣ . It indicates that the match
result is actually unknown to CP, CSP and attacker if they cannot get the se-
cret authorization key skΣ of the data user B. If the attacker can not verify the
correctness of his guess, he could not launch KG attack on this system.
Thus, the proposed system could resist the off-line KG attack.
9. Conclusion
Supporting expressive keyword search over encrypted data is a highly desir-
able functionality in outsourced storage systems. In this paper, we proposed a
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query over encrypted data system that supports the most flexible query patterns
among existing searchable encryption systems in the literature, including con-
junctive queries, range queries, boolean queries and mixed queries. We formally
defined the system model, attack model and security model. Extensive security
analysis showed that our system is secure and can resist keyword guessing at-
tack. Through performance analysis and experiments we demonstrated that our
system outperforms all other existing public key searchable encryption systems.
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